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Culture in the ‘Politics of Identity’ 






Based on a year long ethnographic study in Dubai, this article explores the following: How do second-
generation Arab migrants articulate and negotiate the legal and social boundaries they are subjected 
to? I take into consideration the relative cultural proximity this group have to Emirati citizens, as well 
as the growing anti-Muslim and Arab sentiments in the West, and how these may implicate their 
experiences and narrations of citizenship and national identity. The majority of respondents did not 
wish to attempt to emulate ‘Emiratiness’, not only because of their lived experiences of exclusion from 
the Emirati community, but also because they saw a degree of dissonance between their lifestyles and 
cultural identities and that of Emiratis. While each participant had a distinct notion of what their ‘Arab 
culture and traditions’ meant, the umbrella of ‘Arabness’ which typifies the UAE was seen as 
preferable to the increasingly racialized and exclusionary forms of governance enacted within the 
West. A central paradox emerged when some second-generation migrants claimed a shared culture to 
the Emirati community and performed Emiratiness. This was on the basis of their historical and 
cultural ties to the region and, more importantly, their family connections with the Emirati community.  
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The Gulf has witnessed an influx of migrants since the oil boom in the 1970s, to such an extent that 
today migrants make up 90 per cent of the country’s population in countries such as the United Arab 
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Emirates (UAE) and Qatar (Ahmad, 2012:1). In spite of the strict migration regimes that prevent 
permanent settlement and naturalisation, migrants have, for decades, made the Gulf their unofficial 
home, something that has led to the existence of second and third generation migrants who are born in 
these countries. However, the lived experiences of the migrants and their descendants have been 
conspicuous by their absence from the contemporary Western literature of migration, citizenship, 
diaspora and second generation. Scholars suggest that very little is known about middle class migrants 
and their descendants in this context because they are considered neither diasporic nor transnational 
due to legal and social policies that position these migrants as temporary and economic (Gardner, 
2010; Fargues, 2011, p.274; Vora, 2013).  
 
Limited yet growing literature on the lived experiences of migrants in the Gulf States, focus on the 
effects of structural exclusions of migrants from host societies on their understandings of belonging 
and identity, such as the absence of naturalisation and long term residencies (see Longva, 2005; Vora, 
2013; Ali, 2011; Gardner, 2011), a highly nationalised schooling system (see Vora, 2013) and a 
workforce that is highly segmented on national, ethnic and racial lines (see Kapiszewski, 2001, Nagy, 
2006; Walsh, 2010). Some of these scholars, challenging the conceptions of identity and belonging as 
based in liberal notions of rights, citizenship and cultural assimilation, investigated how migrants 
protected themselves against the systematic vulnerability of their temporariness in the Gulf, utilizing 
their privileged socio-economic locations (see Vora, 2013 for Indian diasporic elite; Kanna, 2011 for 
middle class South Asians in Dubai).  
 
Moreover, the existing Gulf literature on migrant lives predominantly focus on the experiences 
of South Asian communities, since they constitute the largest population in the Gulf. Arab 
migrant communities and their children, despite outdating the more recent and rather temporary 
migrant flows to Gulf from South Asia and Western Europe, are virtually absent from Gulf 
scholarship (Babar, 2014, p.1-3). Their experiences require close attention, because their cultural 
proximity to the Gulf States have historically created a sense of social and political threat among 
the authorities for these communities’ perceived ability to affect the boundaries of the nation 
(Kapiszweski, 2001; Fargues, 2011; Babar, 2014; Manal, 2015; Chalcraft, 2010).  
 
Non-Gulf Arab migrant groups comprised up to 75 percent of the foreign workforce by the 
1970s, whereas today they constitute less than 25 percent of the Gulf populations (Babar, 2014, 
p.3). Pan-Arabism, a political ideology that spread to the Arab Gulf region by Arab migrant 
workers during the 1950s and 1960s, also shaped the perception of local Gulf populations 
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towards Arab migrant groups favorably (Chalcraft, 2010, p.13). Arab migrants were welcomed 
as ‘brothers’, and local groups pressed for better rights for these groups (Chalcraft, 2010, p.8). 
The growing support by local populations for Arab nationalism, threatened the political 
legitimacy of Gulf rulers, who in turn, systematically reduced the number of Arab workers and 
recruited a predominantly South Asian migrant workforce (Chalcraft, 2010; Jamal, 2015). The 
idea behind the diversification of migrant populations in the Gulf had been to decrease the 
chances of community formation and political activation among dominant groups in society 
(Jamal, 2015; Kanna, 2011). 
 
Drawing on the findings of my doctoral research in Dubai between 2015 and 2016, this article 
explores how the cultural identities (ethnicity, language, and religion) of non-Gulf Arab second 
generation migrants in Dubai, are implicated in the diverse ways that they articulate legal and 
social boundaries that exist between them and their host society, and, consequently, their 
imaginations of the ‘Emirati nation’. In understanding how respondents shape their belonging to 
the UAE, this paper also takes into consideration the impact of growing anti-Muslim and Arab 
sentiments and increasing immigration restrictions in Western countries (i.e. President Trump’s 
executive order on blocking citizens of six predominantly Muslim countries from entering the 
United States). Whilst acknowledging the importance of access to citizenship in the way 
boundaries are experienced by migrant groups, I argue that, these boundaries are not fixed and 
are experienced differently based on individuals’ migration trajectories, their historical and 
cultural affiliations with the host community as well as changing political and social climate. By 
showing similar processes of boundary making, I try and draw closer connections between the 
migrant lives in the Gulf States and the wider migration studies literature. This is important to 
do so as the former is often regarded as a sociologically exceptional region due to the absence 
of citizenship access for migrants and the latter is historically shaped by the experiences of 




The traditional immigration countries which produced the literature on second generation 
historically focused on issues of integration or assimilation and public policies for a better 
incorporation of second generation. The second generation migrants’ identity is often analysed 
within the context of trans-nationalism and diaspora (Vertovec, 1999; Gilroy, 1997; Hall, 1990) 
as a result of these communities putting their roots elsewhere and their descendants being born 
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and raised in host societies (Brah, 1996). The literature discussed widely, how access to 
citizenship rights, and acquiring social and cultural skills through education, friendships and 
language enabled a ‘better integration’ of second generation to their host societies, when 
compared to their parents (Alba, 2005). 
 
There are two main reasons that require a reframing in the way we understand and study the second 
generation in the GCC. First, explaining second generation identities only through their social and 
cultural integration to host society ignores how broader social and power relations as well as structures 
of class, gender, race and ethnicity or other markers of differentiation in the country of settlement play 
a role in the identity process (Brah, 1996: 182, Anthias, 2002). In order to understand how migrant 
groups are placed within the social and power relations as well as structural and institutional practices 
(Vertovec, 2001), we need to analyse diasporas in its context (Brah, 1996:182). Second, in relation to 
the first point, the ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ separation between citizens and migrants in the Gulf States 
(Fargues, 2011), suggest that there are no concern for migrants’ integration to the national 
communities, for they are perceived to pose a threat to the national cultural homogeneity (Vora, 2013). 
This is in contrast to the majority of traditional immigration receiving countries in the West, where 
immigration is integral to the public policy. As a result, identities in Dubai are argued to be constructed 
against each other, migrants versus citizens, (Ticku, 2010), rather than through cultural and social 
interactions.  
 
Considering the limitations of applying the second generation literature from the ‘West’ to the 
experiences of the group I study, I use theories of boundary making (Barth, 1969; Yang, 2000) and 
performing (Edensor, 2002; Butler, 1993) in investigating how inclusions to and exclusions from the 
nation are imagined and negotiated, and how the decision making processes surrounding the ‘boundary 
line of the nation’ are articulated (Skey, 2013:92; Yuval-Davis, 2011). I argue that like any other type 
of identity, national and cultural identity, imply both sameness, authenticity and a degree of difference 
from others. Determining in/exclusions into a group, society or national identity, functions within a 
structure of power in which dominant group members can construct, maintain and/or rework the 
boundaries of belonging. In order to understand the boundary lines of an ethnic or national group, we 
need to consider the larger historical and structural context as well as the political and economic 
interests that determine it (Yang, 2000).  
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While I argue that the nation-state is central in constructing these boundaries formally, for example 
through access to citizenship, boundaries are also shaped informally, for example based on perceptions 
of difference (Skey, 2013). It is the boundary line of the nation where people understand ‘who they 
are (not) or ought (not) to be’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011). That being said, I also acknowledge the role of 
performance in (re)producing and consolidating identities, achieved through ‘incorporating rituals’ by 
individuals (Butler, 1993: Edensor, 2002). In this sense, performance is used as a search for 
commonality with citizens as well as a differentiation from them, i.e. as a tool of negotiating 




My doctoral research investigated the experiences of national identity and citizenship in Dubai 
both among citizens and non-citizens. Out of a total 56 interviews, 20 of them were with second 
generation non-Gulf Arab migrants. Aged between 25 to 34, they were all born and raised in the 
UAE. Parents of my informants have arrived in the UAE from mid/late sixties to early eighties. 
Only a two of them have worked in the Gulf earlier (Kuwait and Bahrain), while for others UAE 
was the first country they migrated. They originated from countries in the Middle East (4 Syrians, 
1 Iraqi, 1 Lebanese, 1 Jordanian, 3 Palestinian-Jordanian); North Africa (3 Sudanese and 3 
Egyptian); East Africa (1 Somalian and 1 Zanzibari) and the Persian side of the Gulf (2 Iranian). 
With the exception of two Sudanese informants, those who arrived from Middle East and Africa 
worked in highly skilled jobs, such as judges, teachers, engineers, bankers, doctors, and were 
educated to university level. The rest of them had taken up lesser skilled jobs, working in 
administrative and technical posts in the army, ports, municipality and local banks. 
 
In recruiting informants, I used a snowballing technique, where I reached potential informants using 
my network of friends, colleagues and acquaintances (Bryman, 2008). Purposive sampling involved 
nationality, place of origin, socio-economic and their social proximity to the host society, as the main 
criteria of selection. The commonality among the sample stems from their ‘Arabness’, whether this 
was self-perceived or ascribed. Acknowledging the contested definitions of the term, this research does 
not dwell into its complexities and neither does it attempt to generalize respondents’ experiences and 
narratives based on a shared identity of ‘Arabness’. It rather shows the reader how ‘Arabness’ is used 
by respondents either in order to assert closer proximity to the Emirati community or distance and 
differentiate themselves from it.  
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Out of 20 informants, 8 were female and 12 were male. 4 informants were Christian, and the rest were 
Muslim (all Sunni, except one Shia denomination). One Jordanian participant held dual citizenship 
from Canada, while an Iraqi participant was an American citizen. Three of the participants (1 
Sudanese, 1 Iranian and Zanzibari) had Emirati family members. 
All the participants were by definition middle or upper-middle class, as there is a minimum income 
requirement for family reunification in the UAE (Ali, 2011). All of the participants are engaged in 
workforce, in skilled capacities and mostly within the private sector, with a few exceptions (six 
informants) who work in local banks, municipalities, schools and airports. Only three out of twenty 
informants were unable to attain higher education due to financial difficulties, while another chose not 
to attend university in order to take over family business.  
With the exception of three (Somalian, Zanzibari, Iranian), all of my participants were educated in 
private schools, which also had Emirati students.1 While these three participants did not school with 
Emiratis, they have spent substantial amount of time with them through their family and friendship 
links, as well as working and living in same spaces. As a result, they were fluent in Emirati Arabic, 
alongside with their native Swahili, Iranian and Somali. Apart from these informants, all participants 
spoke Arabic as their first language.  
None of my participants had lived in their parents’ countries of origin, while their visits varied 
depending on their countries’ political situations. None of my participants and their families professed 
plans to return to their countries. In fact, ‘return’ was not a viable option for informants, with the 
exception of Jordanian passport holders. This is because in relative terms, Jordan is perceived as the 
most politically stable country and Jordanian passport as the most ‘privileged’.  
In order to contextualize my informants’ narratives, I have started the interviews by asking them about 
their families’ migration trajectories to the UAE, their childhood memories, the neighborhoods they 
grew up, their schooling experiences, their friendships, and work experiences. In order to reveal 
insights into how my participants articulate legal and social exclusions and discourses, I asked how 
they perceived their belonging in these societies both on legal and social terms, and whether their 
cultural background made a difference in the way they experienced everyday life and interactions with 
the local community. With these questions, I also explored their coping strategies with their 
                                                     
1 Schooling in Arabic is provided free of charge by the government to all citizens, whereas non-citizens need to opt for a wide range of 
privatised education options, either nationality, faith-based schools or international schools teaching in Western curriculums (Vora, 
2013, p.147). 
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‘temporary’ statuses in Dubai, their future plans, and Dubai’s place within.  
I have used an inductive approach to analyze my data where I aimed to identify patterns, themes, and 
categories emerging from the field (Patton, 1980, p. 306). While theory and literature review enabled 
the interpretation of my empirical data, it did not determine my findings, more so, considering the 
limited literature on the experiences of national identity and citizenship among young Emirati citizens 




Findings & Discussion  
 
Imagining the Emirati nation through citizenship  
 
Official and popular discourses define Emirati national identity through citizenship, one that is 
premised on shared ancestry, kinship and descent among those who are in possession of Emirati 
passports: Bedouin, tribal and Arab. At the core of these widely pronounced narratives lie the idea that 
immigration to the United Arab Emirates is a post-oil phenomenon, which brought cultural, social, 
economic and political implications on the ‘homogenous native population’, who become numerically 
a minority in their own country. Thus, despite the ethnic, tribal and cultural differences within Emirati 
citizens, today the diversity in the UAE is solely attributed to migrants, who, through their legal and 
social exclusion from the national community, have become crucial to the construction and 
maintenance of Emirati citizenship and national identity (Vora, 2013; Kanna, 2011).  
 
The official and popular discourses around Gulf national identity, inclusive of Emirati identity, is 
central to the ways in which these populations are imagined as homogenous and absolute, especially 
by outsiders. The large degree of social distance between national and migrant groups in Gulf societies 
and the discreteness of nationals about their origins, helps to cultivate and reproduce these widely held 
beliefs.  
 
Despite sharing linguistic and cultural proximity to nationals and decades-long residency in the 
country, second generation Arab migrants’ conceptions of national identity and citizenship were very 
similar to those of official discourses and citizens, in the way they perceived themselves as outsiders.  
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Moreover, despite knowing the ethnic diversities within the citizenry, second generation Arab migrants 
did not imagine Emirati citizens as being culturally diverse. This is because they equated having 
Emirati citizenship to cultural belonging. An Iraqi participant, Sulaiman, who has close relations with 
Emiratis, illustrates this: 
 
“By looking at Emiratis or talking to them, I can tell where they came from. But to be 
honest, I don’t care about that, no Emirati would tell you oh my origins are Iranian. They 
have been here a long time. It is something that they discuss or joke only amongst 
themselves. No expats would know these differentiations unless you are really inside their 
communities. As long as you hold the passport, you are Emirati to me”.  
 
Sulaiman’s family has been in the UAE since the late 1960s, which is as long as some of the 
naturalized Emirati citizens. Yet, ironically, his imagining of Emiratis as a culturally 
homogenous group is based on their length of residence and their legal membership. These 
contradictory remarks are indicative of the weight of official governmental discourses on the 
way that outsiders understand the boundaries of the Emirati nation. In fact, it is non-citizen forms 
of belonging in the UAE that purifies national identity together with state projects of heritage, 
which reinforce the illusion of commonality among citizens (Vora, 2013; Longva, 2005).   
 
Being subjected to legal and social exclusion did not mean, however, that my second-generation 
informants claimed no ‘deservingness’ to Emirati citizenship. The majority of my informants’ 
parents were officially invited to the UAE to introduce the country to key fields such as law, 
medicine, and engineering. Thus, in conversations related to naturalization, second-generation 
Arab migrants underscored both the modern-ness and advanced-ness of their families’ country 
of origin (see, Khalaf, 2005) as well as their parents’ contributions to building the nation and to 
its economic growth. Othman, a Jordanian participant whose father arrived in the UAE in the 
late 1960s to work as a judge, illustrates this: 
 
“My father’s colleagues were Syrians, Egyptians, Iraqis and small numbers of Sudanese 
in Ministry of Justice. Our countries have been up and running long time before the UAE, 
so they invited us to help to set up laws, regulations etc. My mum taught English to 
Emiratis. Emiratis were intrigued with our mind-set, the way we spoke elegantly, the way 
we dressed in a Western style… They were very welcoming to us, wanted to be modern 




These narratives were recurrent among informants, which resembled those of wealthy Indian gold 
merchants in the early days of the ‘Dubai boom’ (see Vora, 2013:34). Considering that power and 
social dynamics within the Emirati society have changed since their parents’ time of arrival, there was 
a conscious reference to an era when, in relation to the local community, their cultural identity was 
perceived as prestigious and the socio-economic positioning of their communities and countries of 
origin was privileged.  
Influenced by their increasing links to the West and other parts of the Middle East, from the 1940s to 
the early federation days in the 1970s, many people in the Gulf have adopted Western clothing (Khalaf, 
2005). Young Gulf citizens at that time saw the Western style of dressing as a signifier of 
modernization and of being educated and worldly, while wearing their traditional dresses was seen as 
something of the past that was destined to decline with modernization (Khalaf, 2005; Onley, 2005). 
Similarly, because of the infiltration of Persian, Baluchi and Urdu elements, Gulf Arabic was perceived 
by other Arabic speakers to be a form of ‘corrupted’ language, in comparison to long-standing 
sophisticated forms of Egyptian and Levant Arabic (Piller, 2017:9). 
With the economic dominance of the Gulf region in comparison to other parts of the Arab World, the 
prestige of Emirati Arabic and national dress is enhanced, however. More importantly, these two 
elements have become the key markers of Emirati national identity (Khalaf, 2005; Onley, 2005). Not 
surprisingly, Emirati respondents were typically displeased by non-Emiratis who try to ‘pass as an 
Emirati’ either through speaking with an Emirati Arabic or wearing the Emirati national dress. 
Similarly, nearly all non-citizen respondents perceived such performances not credible and 
unrecognized by Emiratis. Alaa, a Palestinian-Jordanian participant tries to legitimize this argument 
through sharing with me what his Emirati friends think of such ‘performances’: 
“I know Palestinians who choose to talk Emirati, wear kandoora, act like Emiratis. They 
have perfected the accent but they don’t look Emirati and Emiratis know that. Emiratis 
think they are trying to get the brownie points with them. They would be like: ‘he is doing 
his best to be like one of us but he is not.’ That is what I hear from my Emirati friends, in 
my presence. Even if I got the passport, I would never talk 100% Emirati or dress like one, 
all day everyday, because I’m just not Emirati”. 
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Not only does Alaa’s statement shows how connotations attached to national dress have now changed 
from being old-fashioned and traditional to powerful and privileged but also how it became an 
important tool in the articulation of identity politics by second generation Arab migrants. Typically, 
the majority of respondents, similarly to Alaa, did not wish to attempt to ‘pass as Emirati’ because for 
them this was something that they would never truly become. The idea that emulating an Emirati 
identity will be unrecognized or displease Emiratis, prove that it is the dominant groups in society have 
the power to construct, maintain and/or rework the boundary lines of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 2011). 
Whilst performing a national identity can be a mean to negotiate the boundaries of a community and 
seek inclusion (Tufail and Poynting, 2013), in the UAE performing Emiratiness was seen as crossing 
the boundaries of Emirati community by Gulf born young Arab migrants. As migrants are placed 
outside these boundaries both in legal and social terms, my respondents avoided ‘passing as Emirati’.  
 
Another recurrent narrative among the informants was the ‘easiness’ of the access to acquiring Emirati 
citizenship in the early years of the federation. While I cannot argue whether it is a reality or merely a 
narrative strategy, nearly all of my informants suggested that their parents were offered citizenship in 
the early years of the federations for their contributions to the UAE, yet they declined the offer on the 
basis of how ‘underdeveloped’ the UAE was and that they did not see a future in this country. In fact, 
many informants were resentful of their parents’ choices. Hamzah, a Sudanese informant born and 
raised in Dubai, notes: 
 
“Yes, we do deserve citizenship in my opinion but it will never happen. My dad was given 
a paper just to sign (through his sponsor) so he would get both the jawaz (passport) and 
jinsiya (citizenship), but he said no. This was back in the 80s, 90s. It was very easy to get 
it at that moment, even those who came after us got it, mainly Palestinians, because they 
knew the right people. Like many other Arabs (migrants), he never thought he would stay 
in the UAE, the country was just desert. My dad’s kafeel, the local guy, says my dad is an 
idiot, in front of me. And from my heart I agree with him. Most of us had the chance, who 
has used his mind and got it, they succeeded. Those who ignored it and refused it, I can 
see how much they are suffering now”. 
 
While these statements show informants’ claims to ‘deservingness’ and their continuing desire 
to acquire Emirati citizenship, the current socio-economic gap between their countries of origin 
and the UAE as well as political instability made my informants ‘grateful’ for the opportunities 
the UAE has offered them (see Babar, 2014, p.2). Moreover, second generation migrants were 
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also grateful for their advantaged positon in the job market in relation to other ‘non-Western’ 
migrant groups, such as South Asians. This is because their linguistic and cultural proximities to 
the local population often enabled them to occupy higher income and skill levels (see Babar, 
2014, for a similar argument in Qatar). 
 
In addition to their economic contributions, second generation Arabs have also utilized the 
umbrella of Arabness and Islam which typifies the UAE, as well as their long-term residency in 
the country, in claiming more ‘deservingness’ than other groups. Even though they had a distinct 
notion of what their ‘Arab culture, values and traditions’ meant, considering the weight that 
‘Arabness’ carries, not only in defining the Emirati citizenry but also claims to citizenship2, they 
expressed a relative proximity for eligibility to naturalization.  
 
“I support it (citizenship policy). Here there is a unique culture, Arab culture. If they give 
it to any nationality that lives here for few years, the land will lose their origin, who they 
are. Not to disrespect any race but what happens if an Indian or an, Iranian comes and says 
I am Emirati? Emiratis are known to be Arabs, so you need to speak Arabic, Muslim, know 
the history, the people…and now country being very rich, and all the benefit citizens get, 
of course everyone wants to get a piece of that. I feel like I have more right to get the 
citizenship say in comparison to an English person, because I am 90% closer to this 
culture… Or if they give citizenship to non-Arabs, they shouldn’t give them all the 
benefits”. (Ashraf, Iranian passport holder who identifies as Arab) 
 
 
As Ashraf states, conflating eligibility for naturalization and citizenship benefits with one’s ethnicity 
is a common narrative among both Emiratis and second generation Arab migrants. Even though both 
Arab migrant groups and Emirati nationals are highly diverse within their own communities, 
‘Arabness’ as a collective, socio-cultural identity is instrumental for both groups, either in marking or 
negotiating the boundaries of the nation: for Arab migrants to  claim more ‘deservingness’ and 
eligibility for citizenship than non-Arab migrants, and for Emiratis to restrict migrants from accessing 
citizenship on the basis of presumed ‘cultural homogeneity’ among citizens (see Yang, 2000: 46-47, 
on instrumental approaches to ethnicity). 
 
                                                     
2 The citizenship law only considers Muslim Arabs and Arabic speakers, who have been in the UAE at least 30 years for naturalization (Ali, 2011).  
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Having said that, informants were aware that the pathway to naturalization was difficult for them, if 
not impossible, as Hamzah stated earlier. Thus, narratives like Ashraf’s, despite being recurrent, were 
often followed by contradictory remarks. Despite their multigenerational existence in the UAE and 
their relative cultural proximity, second generation Arab migrants underlined the fact that there was 
no difference between them and any other migrant group, both in terms of their legal status and 
precarious future in the UAE and in the way the Emirati community perceived them. Ziad, a Syrian 
respondent, illustrates this point: 
 
“Let me tell you something, there is no differences between me and a Filipino or Pakistani 
guy who gets a job and comes to Dubai today. If his visa gets cancelled or mine, we have 
to leave at the same time. They are not going to be like oh Ziad has been here all his life. 
I just would like something that proves that this is home, even permanent residency is fine. 
I am not after being recognized as Emirati because that would most likely not happen, 
because even if we become Emiratis, we won’t be the original ones, we will be like second 
class, the immigrants. We are very rooted in our Levantine traditions and Emiratis in 
theirs… Isn’t it the same for like Turks in Germany”? 
 
 
As Ziad states, the majority of informants did not wish to attempt to emulate ‘Emiratiness’, not only 
because of their lived experiences of exclusion from the Emirati community, but also because they 
saw a degree of dissonance between their lifestyles and cultural identities and those of Emiratis. 
Therefore, Ziad and the majority of informants stated that they were indifferent to the recognition of 
their social membership to the Emirati community, as long as their permanency in the UAE was 
assured. In order to show that social and legal membership do not need to go hand in hand, he gives 
examples from Western societies, which reads as an internalization of legal and social stratifications 
within a society.  
 
Ziad’s statements were shared by the majority of respondents. Such narratives among the 
participants support the body of literature which argues that the rejection of jus soli, the law of 
birthplace, not only hinders social, political and cultural integration (Brubaker, 1992) but also 
feeds insecurities and non-belonging among second generation ‘migrants’, who as a result come 
to identify themselves primarily as members of racial, national, ethnic, or religious groups 
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Isin and Wood, 2009) 
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Moreover, informants like Ziad may think that asking only for permanent residency and having no 
intention to perform Emiratiness may please the Emiratis, who perceive migrants as a social, cultural 
and economic threat to their communities. Therefore, by suggesting that they should be included only 
through permanent residency, in my participants’ imaginations they are maintaining desired social 
boundaries between citizens and migrants while softening the legal ones. Having said that, the next 
section in this article will show how some second generation migrants, in contrast, claimed cultural 
belonging to the UAE and performed Emiratiness. 
 
Last but not least, internalization of official citizenship policies by second generation Arab migrants 
is also related to political concerns. Many informants, similar to Emirati citizens, attributed social 
cohesion and political stability in the UAE to its strict naturalization policy, even though this system 
excluded people like them. These views stem from the fact that many of my informants originate from 
some of the most politically instable countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the 
impact of growing anti-Muslim and Arab sentiments and increasing immigration restrictions in 
Western countries also drew them closer to the UAE. Moustafa, a Sudanese informant, illustrates this 
popular sentiment: 
 
“If I am going to compare UAE with other countries, I can say from my side that I live in 
paradise. The safety, no terror… Look at all the issues Europe, maybe this is the reason 
why UAE keeps citizenship limited. Good luck being a Muslim in Europe now…We have 
family there but to be honest, even though I would like citizenship from there, I will come 
back to Dubai afterwards, where my culture is no issue. My family says this is not your 
country, but no this is my country! I won’t do anything wrong to jeopardise my stay. I 
studied here, I was born here, I slept here, I ate here. 90% of the family is in Sudan yet I 
don’t feel the same connection. Why should I have any allegiance to a country with full of 
corruption and no respect for citizens”? 
 
Despite not having the benefits that citizens have, second generation migrants’ sentiments were very 
similar to Emiratis in the way they equated having allegiances to a country with the opportunities it 
provided for them. Moreover, in comparison to increasingly racialized and exclusionary forms of 
governance enacted within the West, targeting communities similar to theirs, informants felt their 
religious commonality with the UAE enabled a ‘cultural inclusion’ and shielded them from being 
perceived as disloyal. Considering the global and regional turmoil, the UAE’s positioning as the 
second safest country in the world is something both citizens and migrants do not want to compromise. 
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While for the vast majority of the respondents acquiring citizenship from a ‘Western’ country is still a 
priority, their future plans increasingly involve returning to the UAE, where they feel their cultural 
identity is not only unproblematic but also relatively privileged when compared to other non-Western 
migrant groups. This section illustrated that, while second generation Arab migrants cannot affect the 
boundaries of the nation, based on their national and cultural backgrounds they experience and 
articulate these boundaries differently, in comparison to other migrant groups. 
 
 
Crossing the boundaries of the nation: ‘Quasi Emiratis’ 
 
The UAE makes no cultural demands from migrant communities except respect for cultural and 
Islamic values and morals in public. In fact, in order to preserve the ‘cultural homogeneity’ of its 
citizens and to prevent cultural threats migrants may pose to the national community, the state manages 
boundaries between these communities not only through the absence of naturalization (Longva, 2005; 
Vora, 2013; Ali, 2011) but also through a highly nationalized schooling system (Vora, 2013) and a 
workforce that is highly segmented according to national, ethnic and racial lines (Kapiszewski, 2001; 
Walsh, 2010).  
 
When compared to other migrant groups, second-generation Arab migrants claimed to share more 
social spaces with Emiratis, such as schooling together in private schools or working in government 
offices. Yet, as I illustrated earlier, this did not result in a closer proximity between these groups, for 
they typically found Emiratis culturally distant and expressed their lack of interest in performing 
Emiratiness. A central paradox emerged, however, when four respondents (Iranian, Somalian, 
Sudanese and Zanzibari) claimed a shared culture with the Emirati community. Their arguments were 
based on their historical and cultural ties to the region and, more importantly, their intimate 
connections, which were enabled by family members who held UAE passports and friendships they 
had acquired with Emiratis since childhood. This group embodied the national dress as everyday wear, 
spoke with a distinctive Emirati dialect and identified closely with the culture and its customs. Even 
though ‘they felt Emirati’ and suggested that they did not need formal affirmation of belonging to the 
national community, they were reluctant to express this as they thought Emiratis would not entertain 
it. 
 
Ashraf is one of these examples. I was introduced to him at a dinner party in Dubai hosted by a friend 
who said that he would be a great person to talk to for my research. He is a second-generation Iranian 
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born and raised in Dubai. His two uncles, who arrived in Dubai in the late 1960s, have received Emirati 
citizenship while Ashraf’s family who arrived in the late 1970s, were unable to do so. Ashraf identifies 
as Arab, speaks the Emirati dialect of Arabic and wears kandoora (Emirati national dress) on a daily 
basis. When we were left alone, I told him that it would have been impossible for me to differentiate 
him from an Emirati. Upon hearing this, he pulled out his phone, smiling, and showed me an Instagram 
photo of himself wearing a blue kandoora entering a Ferrari. He told me that people not only think 
that he is Emirati but they also think that he comes from an influential family, especially since he 
started trimming his beard in an ‘Emirati fashion’. When I complimented him on his kandoora, he 
says, “Ya, this is what we wear in winter, darker clothes”. He went on to explain his roots: 
 
“Where I am from in Iran is all Arabs, we are Arabs. But I don't want to say this openly 
and then being blamed for ‘trying too hard to be Emirati’. But the older generation Emiratis 
know who we are. Once I was in Khor Fakkan, at an Emirati friend’s house, when his 
father asked me where I am from. When I replied Qeshm, he said ‘oh you are Arab; you 
are one of us’! I feel we are more Arabs; I mean more Arabs than Ajam. They have come 
from Southern Iran but we are an island that is so close to the UAE. Al Jismi, Al Zarouni, 
all these big Emirati families are from Qeshm”. 
 
Being from an island that is in close geographic, historic and cultural proximity to the Arabian shores 
of the Gulf and having Emirati family members were added benefits in Ashraf’s claims to Emiratiness. 
His performances of Emiratiness were not solely to negotiate status and seek inclusion, but a natural 
consequence of being brought up in an Emirati-dominated social environment. Yet, he was still 
cautious about asserting himself as Arab and Emirati in Emirati environments because he felt that his 
belonging was not recognized, at least in formal terms. This shows that self-identifying as belonging, 
on its own, is not enough and needs to be “supplemented and recognized” by group members (Jones 
and Krzyanowski, 2008:49).  
 
Hussain shared sentiments similar to Ashraf’s. Both of Hussain’s uncles hold Emirati passports, while 
his father and family have been waiting to receive their passports for the past 25 years. Hussain 
identifies as Emirati and is often identified as Emirati by others, based on his performances of 
Emiratiness. Earlier in the chapter I illustrated how his surname, which is known in the region, meant 
that people ‘mistake’ him for an Emirati. Hussain suggests that his and his family’s cultural affiliation 
with the Emirates matters more than ‘the color of their passport’, for all Emiratis think they are ‘local’: 
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“My children are 100% Emirati. They have never even been to Tanzania. So I took my 
oldest son there, I said listen man you have a Tanzanian passport so let’s go and see what 
it is like over there (laughs). All my children know how to do yola dance (traditional folk 
dance). When teacher asks in classroom, they are the first one to volunteer, even before 
the locals (he smiles proudly and shows me pictures from a national day celebration where 
his kids performed yola)”. 
 
Similar to Hussain, Tamer, a second-generation Somali informant, can easily pass as an Emirati. He 
has two Emirati uncles and his family has been in the UAE since the mid-1970s. Tamer culturally 
identifies as Emirati as a result of his lived experiences. He tells me that many migrants try to pass as 
Emirati by simply ‘throwing on a dishdasha’. Yet, he differentiates himself from these groups and tells 
me that being Emirati is about knowing the rituals, history and culture of the UAE and even small 
things like ‘greeting one another by nose to nose kiss’. Both Hussain and Tamer told me that these 
cultural traits were acquired by hanging out with Emiratis all their lives and were not available to other 
migrants living in the UAE. Through their lived experiences and cultural assimilation, they sought to 
affect the boundaries of the nation differently from other migrant groups (Bell, 1999; Fortier, 2000). 
Moustafa, a Sudanese participant, shared similar sentiments to Ashraf, Hussain and Tamer, despite not 
having any Emirati family or historical roots to the UAE. Born and raised in Karama, next to a 
compound housing Dubai Army personnel, Moustafa grew up in close proximity with Emiratis and 
learned to speak with an Emirati accent. In our discussion, Moustafa told me how strongly attached he 
feels to the UAE, despite not being Emirati, and disagrees with his family who often remind him that 
this is not home and that he will eventually have to leave.  
 
 
“For what this country has done for me, even if I give my soul it won’t be enough. If they 
make army service available to non-locals, I would do it. I am not same as any other expat, 
fresh off the boat. Officially I belong with the expat group but when it comes to social 
interactions, I am more towards the UAE society. I speak all the languages of Dubai. I 
would be much more preferred at work places because of this but also since I know how 
to deal with different nationalities based on my upbringing in a place like Karama. I know 
how to deal with an Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani or a local. I know how this system 
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As seen from Moustafa’s statement, national service is not only seen as a platform to express patriotism 
and loyalty to the state, but also a way to ‘pay back’ the Emirates, which Moustafa sees as home. These 
narratives of patriotism can also be seen as migrants, like Moustafa, trying to establish a dialogue with 
their host community and the collective identity of Emiratiness in which they aspire to be included 
(see Landi, 2000). 
 
Moustafa, despite being a high-school dropout, now holds a managerial position in one of the 
international banks. He owes his success to the social and cultural capital (his Emirati appearance, 
accent and connections) he has managed to accumulate in the UAE, which were perceived as 
‘priceless’ in the eyes of his employers. He provided me with another example of how his close 
proximity to the local culture had helped him out of situations. One night, he and his friends were 
hanging out in their neighbourhood and were falsely taken by the police for interrogation relating to a 
reported burglary. As Moustafa tried to explain the situation, the police mistook Moustafa as being 
Emirati because of his demeanour and his accent. The officer only realised that Moustafa was not 
Emirati when he has handed over his identification. The police officer was equally surprised to hear 
Moustafa speaking both in Urdu and Farsi with his friends, languages in which many Emiratis, 
especially older generation, are able to converse. As the situation was cleared, Moustafa told me 
proudly what the police officer said to him and his friends: 
 
                              “You are Emirati to me, you are the children of this country”.   
 
The statements by this group suggested that their performances of Emiratiness were a natural 
consequence of their upbringing in close proximity to the national community, which has become part 
of their social habit memory (Edensor, 2002). This shows that while in general essentialised forms of 
identities are more common in the UAE, non-citizens can learn to perform Emiratiness and achieve a 
degree of competence based on their personal connection to the place and people (Goffman, 1999). 
This in turn has the potential to blur the boundaries between migrants and citizens and complicate the 
official and popular equation of citizenship (as legal membership) to national identity (cultural 
belonging) in the Emirates. Having said that, whilst ‘quasi Emiratis’ often differentiated themselves 
from other expats and even from other second-generation migrants in claiming stronger belonging to 
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the national community, they shared the same insecurities as the rest of my second-generation 
respondents in the way they were worried about their future in the UAE. This was simply a result of 






Official and popular definitions of the Emirati nation have been central in the way second generation 
Arab migrants imagined the nation and evaluated in/exclusions to it. By officially defining national 
identity through citizenship and declaring it as Arab and Islamic-, these narratives have transformed 
existing assumptions about what constitutes Arabness (Longva, 2006; Limbert, 2014: 595). As a result, 
not only an ethnized but also a racialized notion of Arabness has been shaped and consolidated in the 
broader Arabian Peninsula (Limbert, 2014:590). Based on qualitative research, this article has 
illustrated how Arabness in Dubai specifically is (re)produced, and how boundaries between migrant 
and citizen groups are reinforced, through everyday performances of different types of Arabness 
among migrant and citizen communities. 
 
Inspired by boundary making theories (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2008; Yang, 2000), I have demonstrated 
that the exclusion of migrants from citizenship and national identity, together with state projects of 
heritage and tradition invention of the Gulf States, have become integral to the boundary construction 
and maintenance between migrant and citizen populations. I argued that, due to sharing ‘Arabness’ as 
an identity, boundaries between Arab migrants and Emirati citizens were became increasingly salient. 
Taking into consideration the larger historical context, where Arab communities’ relevant cultural 
proximity to the local populations were perceived as a social and political threat by the Gulf States 
(Chalcraft, 2010), I argued that boundaries and identities are also shaped in response to political and 
social events. Even though second generation Arab migrants share more social spaces with Emiratis 
than other migrants, it was through this socialising that they established cultural boundaries to mark 




While official and popular discourses are central in demarcating the boundaries between migrant and 
citizen populations, they cannot fully control the way people affect these boundaries based on their 
individual experiences (Yuval-Davis, 2011). I illustrated this, firstly, by showing how some second-
generation migrants, some of whom are not Arab, claimed a similar culture to the Emirati community 
and performed Emiratiness on an everyday basis. Secondly, I showed how increasingly racialized and 
exclusionary forms of governance enacted within the West for passport holders from the Middle East 
and North Africa, (re)shaped second generation Arab migrants’ sense of proximity to the UAE. Even 
though participants of this study typically had a distinct notion of what their ‘Arab culture’ meant, 
‘Arabness’ which typifies the UAE was seen by second generation migrants as preferable and 
compatible with their cultural identity when compared to other potential countries for settlement.  
 
The findings of this research contribute to the growing yet limited literature on migrant lives in the 
Gulf States, which predominantly attend to the experiences of South Asian migrant groups. Findings 
in this paper, illustrated how, despite being subjected to the same citizenship and migration policies, 
second generation Arab migrant groups in the UAE experience social and legal boundaries between 
them and the local populations differently, based on their particular migration trajectory, their 
historical and cultural affiliation with the host community, as well as their nationality and the wider 
historical and political context: first, in the way Arabness was used by respondents both as a mean to 
express the degree of distance felt from Emirati citizens as well as a tool to establish proximity with 
them. Second, in comparison to other migrant groups, such as South Asians, the Arab migrants I 
interviewed expressed having increasingly limited options if they had to leave the UAE. The political 
turmoil present in the majority of the countries they originate from and the restrictive visa and 
immigration regimes in the West for such passport holders limited the countries that the informants 
could potentially emigrate to for education, settlement and citizenship acquisition (Khaishgi, 2017). 
This showed that, even though the migrants may arm themselves with strategic solutions to combat 
their temporary situation in the Gulf, the ability to connect socially and economically to multiple 
locales around the world, is determined not only by class but also nationality (Ruhs, 2013; Vora, 2013). 
 
In addition to its contribution to Gulf Studies, the findings of this study also draw closer links between 
the Persian Gulf States, an understudied region despite their migrant dominant populations, and the 
wider literature on migration studies. The literary tendency to consider migrant populations of the Gulf 
as temporary, and therefore not diasporic or transnational, risk overlooking the everyday experiences 
of long term migrants in this region, and consequently positioning this part of the region as a 
‘sociological exception’. By illustrating how boundaries between migrant and citizens populations in 
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the UAE, are constructed and maintained as a response to social, political and economic events, I show 
the similar processes that explain the inclusions and exclusion of certain individuals to/from the 
boundaries of a nation. I argue that these boundaries are never absolute and fixed, even in the Gulf 
States, where exclusion of migrants from citizenship might suggest so.  
 
 
While citizenship is central in demarcating boundaries both in the Gulf States and Europe, they do not 
solely determine how individuals identify themselves as being a part of the community  or identified 
by others as such. Inclusions to and exclusions from the boundary of a nation is shaped by 
differentiated experiences and cultural affiliations individuals have with dominant groups in society. 
This is most evident in the way some second generation migrants in the UAE, despite not having access 
to citizenship, narrate themselves as a part of the nation, whilst many second generation born in the 
‘Western’ countries, despite being legal members of these nations by birth, may feel alienated from 
dominant groups in their society. In this sense, the UAE is not an exceptional case, instead resembles 
any other society, where the promise of ‘full citizenship’ is a ‘myth’ (see Cohen, 2009:12) 
 
 
The legal and social boundaries between migrant and citizen populations respond to social and political 
circumstances and therefore need to be examined within the larger historical and political context. 
Considering the unrest in the region and ensuing turmoil and political instability in the most densely 
populated Arab countries, one might expect political concerns of Gulf authorities towards Arab 
migrant populations to be reconfigured and reshape GCC countries’ policy making (Babar, 2014).  
This is why it is important to see how political events affect not only the way certain migrant 
populations shape their identities in relation to local populations and vice-versa, but also their future 
plans in relation to Gulf countries, their countries of origin and elsewhere. Studying these populations’ 
experiences and changing dynamics of boundaries between migrant and citizenship populations in the 
Gulf- whether on formal or informal basis- are crucial in understanding future migration flows to and 
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